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Aug., 1953
EMPLOYER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
CHARLES A. GRAHAM and ARTHUR K. UNDERWOOD, JR.
- of the Denver Bar
Two important factors in labor-management relations have
significance necessary to an understanding of specific aspects of
labor law. First, the labor-management relation affects matters of
vital importance to those involved (property rights, personal rights
and actual survival in a business world), and this is so more than
with many other fields of law. The social and political overtones
of this fact add to the intensity and scope of the problem. Second,
labor law has developed from a beginning in which management
was dominant and unreasonable through a pendulum swing in
which labor has achieved a certain ascendancy. This has resulted
in bitter feelings on both sides. It has also resulted in important
psychological concepts on both sides which have distorted the real
problems involved.
As this pendulum swung, management was always thinking
in terms of an immediate past in which the rules were more favor-
able to management than thereafter. Consequently, management
developed an approach to labor relations in which the labor move-
ment was seen as a gradual encroachment on a lawful and rightful
status quo. On the other hand, labor supporters felt that they had
had to wring from management rights which should have been
labor's anyway. Labor saw a pattern of continuing resistance to
the acceptance of labor rights which had already been written
into the law of the land.
One unfortunate effect of all this has been that management
and labor have both tended to become more and more aggressive,
often making somewhat unrealistic demands. Recently there has
been some indication that both of these attitudes have undergone
revision. Enough remains, however, to justify the statement that
one of the most important services a labor-management counsellor
can perform for his client, on either side of the table, is to ac-
quaint him with the "facts of life" in labor law. When this is
done, much of the misunderstandings which produce unfair labor
practices will be dispelled. But until it is done, there will be an
insufficient appreciation of the real issues which are involved in
these cases.
Unfair labor practices can be understood only in the light of
the rights sought to be protected by the National Labor Relations
Act (U. S. Code, Title 29, Sections 151 et seq.). The Act protects
workers in organizing themselves into unions and bargaining con-
cerning the terms of employment with employers. An unfair labor
practice by an employer is a violation of these rights. Adminis-
tration of the Act has been conducted by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board which has exhaustively explored all phases of the
industrial relation to the end that the parties will really deal at
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arm's length as equals. It is in the wide ramifications of this
attempt to give labor equal strength and knowledge that some of
the misunderstanding about unfair labor practices has arisen.
Section 8(a) of the Act forbids the following employer con-
duct:
(1) Interference with, restraint or coercion of employees in
the exercise of their guaranteed rights.
(2) Domination of, interference with or financial or other
support of labor organizations.
(3) Discrimination in hire, tenure or condition of qmploy-
ment aimed at encouragement or discouragement of union
membership, except that the union shop is authorized,
consistent with state law. (Under a union shop an em-
ployee must join the union after employment and the
union must accept him or at least his initiation fee and
dues which qualify him for employment.)
(4) Discrimination against an employee for filing charges or
giving testimony under the Act.
(5) Refusal to bargain collectively with the employee repre-
sentative, where duly selected.
It should be noted that the right of a worker to refrain from
union activity is also protected. This points up the fact that there
are really four entities with rights in this picture. Other than
the employer and the union, the individual employee and- the gen-
eral public are also involved. The adjudication of all of these in-
terests requires a series of compromises which constitute the
specific rules we are about to discuss.
Organizational drives produce many unfair labor practice
problems. The employees' right to organize and the employer's
right to run his business and control the use of his property come
into square conflict. The problems involve a related section of
the Act, 8 (c), which is the "free speech" provision. This section
declares that expressions of opinion containing no promise of
benefit or threat of reprisal neither constitute nor evidence an
unfair labor practice. We will begin the discussion with the organ-
izational phase but remember that these principles apply through-
out the relations.
Employers are responsible for the acts of supervisory per-
sonnel and, in some cases, the acts of employees, private citizens
or town officials where the employer initiates or encourages the
activities, and fails to disavow them publicly. The rules are not
the same as those of agency; they represent a realistic recogni-
tion by the Board of the devious ways in which an employer can
influence the behavior of others (3730).1Spying on employees, questioning employees as to union ac-
tivities and other methods of getting information about the union
activities of employees constitute ULP (unfair labor practices).
1 Unless otherwise indicated, citations will be to Commerce Clearing House
Labor Law Reporter.
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Subterfuges such as hiring a detective to investigate "thefts" will
fail if thefts have not increased but labor organization has recently
been commenced. Polling employees or requiring applicants to
declare their union views are forbidden (3740).
The removal of a plant to another location, the "runaway
shop," is forbidden where it is motivated by an anti-union con-
sideration. Of course a legitimate business purpose, if the real
motivation, is a sufficient excuse even though the incidental effect is
to discourage unionism (3795).
Of course any physical attack on the union organizer is for-
bidden (3780). In addition, threats, however subtle are ULP
(3770). In determining whether a statement by an employer is
protected by the free speech provision or whether it is an ULP,
the exact language used, the circumstances in which it was made,
and the employer's history of attitude toward unionism are im-
portant. Of course, if the statement is held to be a threat, the free
speech provision simply does not protect it (5000).
The employer may give his opinion that unionism has noth-
ing to offer the employees and that the employees will be better
off by voting against the union. He may state his preference be-
tween unions. He may defend himself against union accusations.
He may do this verbally or in writing, though the latter is prefer-
able even if the speech is read as it helps to avoid difficult ques-
tions as to just what was said (5000).
But if the context of the employer's remarks suggests that
the employer will use his economic power to make the employees
worse off if the union wins, or, conversely, to make the employees
better off if the union loses, then it is an ULP. Profanity and
vigorous, emotional forms of expression do not change the picture
unless the overall effect of the statement is changed (3770-5000).
The fact that the threat was ineffective is no defense
(3770.02). Conduct may also constitute a threat as, for instance,
a discriminatory discharge which, of course, will influence other
employees (3770.10). The threat may involve less than discharge,
such as the curtailment of privileges (3770.22), personal violence
(3770.40), or even isolation of an individual by work assignment
(3770.588), and it is still an ULP.
Of course the carrying out of threats is an ULP and this is
true whether the threat was communicated or not. Discharges,
layoffs, demotions, refusals to reinstate or to hire originally are
all ULP if made for anti-union reasons. A "constructive" dis-
charge can occur by unfair job conditions causing an employee
to quit. As illustrative of the fact that the nut of the matter is
the employer's intent, note these results. If the employer thinks
an employee has been guilty of something that would justify dis-
cipline, if true, the discipline is not an ULP even though the em-
ployer is mistaken and the employee in actuality was not guilty
(2210.154). Further, if the employer's motivation was not anti-
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union, the discharge is not an ULP even though an incidental
effect is to discourage unionism (2210.16).
However, many difficult problems exist in determining whether
the reason for the employer's disciplinary action was anti-union
or not. The employer's mistaken belief as to whether or not the
employees' activity .was protected by the Act is no defense
(2210.153). An example of this difficulty is the question of
whether an employer can discharge an employee who refuses to
cross a picket line around some other employer's plant in the
course of his employment. The employer's right to have his work
performed and the employee's right to participate in concerted
activities for mutual protection meet head-on. Though the Board
is more favorable to the employee, the Court answer is probably
that the employee must cross the picket line during working hours
on pain of discharge (2210 notes .29, .30, .173, .435-.438, .64, .654).
Furthermore, the good faith of the employer in claiming the
discharge was "for cause" is often in question. Company rules
called into being or revived from disuse which was first applied
against union organizers are speedily rejected as legitimate bases
for discipline. Misconduct by employees, absenteeism, lateness,
dishonesty, insubordination, and similar matters are subjected
to close scrutiny by the Board before being allowed to sustain
discharges. The relative triviality or seriousness of the employee
conduct, the position of the employee in the union picture, the
employer's proper or anti-union history, as well as the equal or
discriminatory application of the applicable company rules are
all considered. Personal inadequacy of the dischargee, such as
incompetence, is usually rejected if first raised after unionism
entered the scene. Business recession or labor-saving devices are
other examples of excuses used.
An example of the refinements produced in developing labor
law is found in the problems associated with the attempts of the
employer to prohibit union solicitation on company time and prem-
ises and the so-called "captive audience" doctrine. An employer
may prevent solicitation during the employees' working hours
provided that the no-solicitation rule applies as well to other sorts
of solicitation, such as for social and charitable purposes
(3825.243). Giving the privilege to one union but not to another
is ULP (3825-2435). However, solicitation on the employer's
premises during the employees' free time may not be prevented
unless the employer can prove that his business justifies this re-
striction, as in retail sales departments where it would interfere
with business.
2
Rules against the distribution of literature fair better. Blanket
no-distribution rules are probably valid unless the physical setup
is such that distribution must be made on company premises to
be effective (3825). Rules against solicitation on company prem-
ises by non-employees are valid with the same exception.
2 Bonwit Teller, 21 Labor Cases 67,025; 197 F. 2d 640.
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The "captive audience" doctrine is a ramification of the rule
that no-solicitation rules must be applied without discrimination.
If the employer forbids the union to use company premises for
solicitation, the employer cannot himself do so for a last-minute-
before-election speech without giving the union a chance to reply.
3
It is unsettled whether or not the "equal opportunity" to be given
the union must also be on company time.
4
The Board has taken the position that the captive audience
applies whether there is a flat no-solicitation rule or not and that
the employer must tender an "equal opportunity" to the union to
reply to an election speech by the employer. 5 In this case nine
days elapsed between the speech and the election so the employer
was not having the "last word" as he had in an earlier Board
case which reached the same result and was cited in the Seam-
prufe case.6 This view seems to be opposed to the position of at
least the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
7
The organizational drive is a means to an end-the estab-
lishment of the union as bargaining representative and the actual
bargaining of the terms and conditions of employment. After an
election and Board certification have determined the employees'
representative, this matter of selection is clear. But the problem
may arise before certification and rules have been developed gov-
erning this phase.
The employer's duty to bargain begins when the employees
have selected a bargaining representative by majority vote and
when that representative has demanded bargaining. When the
employer receives such a demand, he then has a duty to bargain
even though there has been no election or certification unless he
has a good faith doubt as to the majority status of the union, or
other representative. If the employer demands an election in
bad faith and in the face of clear proof (by membership cards,
for instance) that the union has a majority or where the Board
finds that the employer did so to gain time to undermine the union,
this is the ULP known as Refusal to Bargain (RTB hereinafter)
(3080).
When a union is elected and certified, this usually insures its
representation status for one year. However, where the employees
submit to the employer proof of their repudiation of the union
within the year, there is a split in the circuits as to the continuing
duty of the. employer to bargain with the union anyway (3080).
After the year is up, and if no contract is then in force, the em-
ployer can again refuse to bargain if he has a genuine doubt as
to the union's majority status but he cannot deliberately limit his
original contract with the union to one year if the motive is solely
I Bonwit Teller, supra.
4 American Tube. Bending Company, 23 Labor Cases 67,671.
5 Seamprufe, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. No. 17; Vol. 2, C.C.H. No. 12,251.
6Biltmore, 97 N.L.R.B. No. 128; C.C.H. 3825.077.
7 Bonwit Teller and American Tube Bending Company, supra.
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to test the union's strength again at the end of the certification
period.
As for bargaining itself, the following topics must be bar-
gained (3020). The Act refers to " . . . rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment or other conditions . . . " and these have
been held to include the exceptional as well as the routine aspects.
Pensions, bonus plans and profit-sharing plans are included. The
employer's practices and procedures for discharge, suspension,
layoff, recall, seniority, promotion, demotion and discipline gen-
erally are bargainable. Vacations, holidays, leaves of absence,
sick leave must be bargained. Safety, sanitation, and health pro-
tection are legitimate topics. Grievances, both individual and
union, are proper. Union security is bargainable except that no
closed shop or preferential hiring agreement is legal. Also, Colo-
rado law requires a three-fourths vote for any form of union
security and all such state limitations are recognized under the
Federal law. Checkoffs are an appropriate subject for bargaining,
and, in any case, each employee's consent must be obtained and
the checkoff can be irrevocable for no longer than one year or the
expiration of the contract, whichever is earlier. Of course the
interpretation of the contract, its term, and arbitration proceed-
ings are bargainable too.
Despite the seemingly complete coverage of the above, there
are a number of topics which have been ruled not bargainable.
The corporate or other structure of the business and the size
and personnel of the official and supervisory force are solely man-
agement concerns. (However, it has been held that the number
of employees in the unit is a proper subject for union concern.)
The general business practices, including the sale or lease of the
business, choice of products to be handled, location of plants,
schedules of production and methods and processes of production
are for management alone. However, these are subject to the rule
against "runaway plants" and it has been held by the Board that
some schedules of production and some subcontracting of work
so affect employees' rights as to be bargainable.
At this point it might be mentioned that the duty to bargain
does not cease with the execution of a contract. Interpretation
of the contract and matters not covered in the contract and not
bargained away must be negotiated as they arise during the
course of the contract. Nor, as we shall see, does the duty to
bargain cease when negotiations fail and a strike occurs, though
it then becomes subject to some exceptions.
The duty is to bargain, not to reach an agreement. There is
nothing in the Act or the cases requiring either party to agree
to anything. A first view of this strange rule might lead one to
believe that a party could go through the motions looking as
though he were bargaining but without any real desire to agree.
However, the Board soon learned to see through such a proceed-
ing. Various clues were used by the Board to show the intent not
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to bargain in good faith which is the test. Remember that the
whole picture is considered by the Board. Anti-union conduct
during organization is often used to find an employer's real intent.
A pattern of details can result in a Refusal to Bargain charge
though one or a few of the items might be insufficient alone.
Failure to answer the union's demand to bargain, failure to
have representatives available at reasonable times and places, and
unreasonable conditions of bargaining (such as, that the union
organize the employer's competitor first!) are RTB. The employer
cannot dictate who shall do the bargaining for the union. He
cannot require that they be employees and it has recently been
held that he cannot require that they sign non-Communist oaths.
(This is not to be confused with the requirement that the union
file certain non-Communist affidavits 2120).
The bargaining must be for all the employees in the unit and
not just the union members. The employer cannot bargain indi-
vidually with his employees, though they are not union members,
if they are in the bargaining unit. Even grievances cannot be
handled between employer and employee without giving the- union
representative a chance to be present if the issue has to do with
the union contract.
Unilateral action by the employer on a bargainable topic dur-
ing negotiations would obviously undercut the union and is RTB.
This is one reason why it is important to know what topics are
bargainable. There are exceptions to this, such as giving raises
to meet the threat of employees leaving for higher wages. But
the Board looks carefully at such excuses and finds them invalid
if the real motive was anti-union.
In the discussions themselves, the employer may be found to
have RTB if he rejects all union proposals and makes none in
return. On the other hand, the submission of ridiculous counter-
proposals may have the same effect! An example of this might
be a proposal by an employer to reduce wages after a union re-
quest to raise wages. Unless the employer has valid business
reasons for the decrease, it may be a RTB.
Changing positions frequently during negotiations, raising
new issues at the last minute, and similar conduct inconsistent
with intelligent bargaining may be evidence of RTB.
The employer mtst provide the union with data on bargain-
able topics to enable the union to bargain intelligently. Wage
rates, job classifications, rate ranges, merit ratings are examples
of the detailed data obtainable by the union. Where the employer
claims that he is financially unable to raise wages, he must give
the union data to support his claim although this may involve
opening his books to some extent.
The fact that a strike occurs does not terminate the duty to
bargain unless it was called in violation of an existing contract
or in violation of the Federal 60-day notice provision. When this




The duty to bargain is also suspended by a genuine impasse
in negotiations. However, a change in conditions which might
break the impasse revives the duty. This may be due to external
events or to a change of position on the part of one of the parties.
Lockout or mass layoffs do not terminate the duty to bargain.
The availability of lockouts and layoffs as bargaining pressure
tactics similar to strikes is discussed elsewhere herein.
If an agreement is reached, the union is entitled to have the
result dignified.by a contract in writing rather than as a declara-
tion of policy by the employer.
A scheme that suggested itself early to ingenious employers
was the establishment of a company-controlled union to keep the
rascals out. The Act prohibits this. The employer cannot inter-
fere in the organization or function of the union in any of its
activities. No- money or other support can be contributed to the
union or its officials except that they may be paid while off the
job during actual bargaining. The employer cannot advance dues
to an employee to join a union. There can be no discrimination
between unions competing for recognition in the use of company
facilities, such as bulletin boards, or the enjoyment of company
privileges, such as solicitation on company time. The employer
must simply keep hands off unions.
Strikebreaking presents a number of special problems. The
theory is that in striking a union is merely applying valid and
legal pressures to persuade or compel the employer to grant con-
cessions. The employer may not use his obvious advantages to
counter in an unfair manner.
There are two types of strikes with quite different rules. A
strike simply to bring pressure upon an employer as an aid to
bargaining is called an "economic strike." A strike in protest
over an ULP of an employer is called an "unfair labor practice
strike." An economic strike may become an unfair labor practice
strike if the employer is guilty of ULP during the pendency of
an economic strike.
ULP strikers are more favored than economic strikers. The
former are entitled to their jobs back, despite replacements, if
they request them within a reasonable time after the strike ends.
Economic strikers may not be discharged while they are still em-
ployees but they may be replaced. If the replacements are intended
to be permanent, the economic strikers are no longer employees
and are not entitled to their jobs after a strike. Both types of
strikers may be awarded back pay after an unconditional offer
to return to a job, to which the striker has a right to return, is
rejected. These rules are subject to the rules on discrimination
discussed above. For instance, in replacing economic strikers,
the employer need not follow any particular order but he cannot
replace only the active unionists. Also, if vacancies occur at a
later date, he cannot use union considerations to determine whom
to employ or re-employ. Although, in the absence of a contract,
DICTA
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an employer need not respect seniority, it is a valid criterion for
employment.
Strikers may not be intimidated or threatened with the loss
of their jobs. However, the employer may notify economic strikers
that their jobs will be filled if they are not at work on a certain
date, though the employer has no duty to notify them before re-
placing them. The employer can persuade employees not on strike
to cross the picket line but he cannot discharge them if they won't
cross it. However, the employer can lay off non-striking employees
whose jobs are cut out by the strike or he can shut down entirely.
Strikers of either type may be discharged for illegal conduct
or for serious violence. Of course if the Board later decides that
the discharged employee was not guilty and the discharge was an
ULP, then all of the strikers may have become ULP strikers with
final rights of reinstatement.
Even though all of the employees who were union members
have been replaced, the union still represents the employees in
that unit. However, subject to the rule against representation
elections within one year of a certification or during an existing
contract, employees (not the employer) can independently petition
to decertify the union even though no other union is in the pic-
ture. The employer is guilty of ULP if he fosters this action.
Incidentally, the vote on such a petition raises interesting prob-
lems since only employees may vote. ULP strikers and unreplaced
economic strikers can vote. Also, economic strikers replaced by
temporary replacements can vote. Economic strikers discharged
because their jobs have been eliminated by changes in the em-
ployer's business operations may be able to vote depending on
the actual prospects for reemployment.
An unsettled question is whether an employer may use the
lockout as a pressure on the employees to aid the employer in
bargaining. The lockout is frequently justified on other grounds,
as necessary to prevent business loss. Examples of this are em-
ployers afraid to take orders which they might not be able to fill due
to a threatened strike, employers whose production facilities must
be shut down gradually and who fear a sudden strike, and em-
ployers afraid of loss of spoilable inventory in the event of a
threatened strike. However, the Board appears to take the posi-
tion that a lockout solely for pressure purposes is ULP. But there
is language in court cases to the effect that the Act intended strikes
and lockouts to be used equally by each side. The final word has
not been spoken.
8
The remedies of the Board (3840, 5600, 4700) include rein-
statement of employees unfairly discharged, demoted, etc., back
pay to such employees and to strikers who have been unlawfully
refused reinstatements, cease and desist orders against ULP, dis-
'See Morand Bros., 20 Labor Cases 66,453 and 23 Labor Cases 67,624;
Leonard et al, 21 Labor Cases 66,997 and 23 Labor Cases 67,689. The Board
cases are cited at 4090.
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establishment of a company-dominated union, and usually a pub-
lic retraction or promise of good behavior by the employer. A
strong incentive for employers to avoid ULP is that a pattern
of them may create a poor labor history when an important mat-
ter gets before the Board.
An employee with a final right of reinstatement gets his job
whether a replacement has been hired or not. However, if the job
no longer exists due to a change in business operations, a similar
position or other equitable solution will be reached. The fact that
the employee has taken another job pending the decision on his
case will not prevent reinstatement if he wants it. Strikers must
unconditionally request reinstatement as a condition precedent to
their right, unless the employer's conduct indicates it would be
futile.
Back pay awards may not include pay during an unnecessary
delay by the employee in filing charges and do not include earn-
ings elsewhere or pay while the employee was unavailable for
work or while the work was unavailable as, for instance, during
a legitimate plant shutdown.
These rules represent compromises between the ownership
and management rights of the employers and the organization and
bargaining rights of the employees. This field of law is still develop-
ing. Broad trends as well as details are subject to change. Eco-
nomic, political and even social pressures are soon reflected in the
labor law. The summary we have presented above is but a momen-
tuary piture o a d~yniai situ 10 -1.
FELLOWSHIP COMMITTEE
With a thousand members, the Denver Bar Association is no
longer the small, friendly organization in which all members are
personally known to each other such as it once was not so long
ago. For many years the Association has maintained a Fellowship
Committee which arranges for visits to members who are ill and
for proper memorials by the Association when any member crosses
the final bar. Such things we still consider important and we
hope that the Association will never become so large that they
become neglected or be submerged in the press of our more
material activities.
Sometimes it is with a shock that we learn of the death of
one of our brothers at the bar many weeks after he has been
laid to rest or learn of the serious illness of a colleague only after
he has returned to his usual routines. Such happenings are in-
evitable in an organization of such a size but they are still re-
garded as lamentable. We ask that all Denver members recall
the existence of the Fellowship Committee when they learn of
the death or serious illness of one of our colleagues and notify
either the Secretary of the Bar Association or Mr. Floyd Walpole,
chairman of the Fellowship Committee.
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